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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Brittany Lonj’e Jones appeals from the district court’s order denying her motion t0

suppress evidence.

Statement

Of The

Facts

The underlying

And Course Of The Proceedings
facts, as set forth in the district court’s

order denying Jones’s motion to

suppress evidence, are as follows:

On December

14,

2017,

at

approximately 3:00 p.m., [Idaho State Police

Sergeant Vance Cox] observed Defendant [Jones] operating a vehicle traveling
north on 1-15 near Idaho Falls. In the Vicinity of Idaho Falls, the Freeway speed

mph

reduced from 80

Broadway

exit,

to

65 mph.

The

is

Parties further agreed that south of the

road signs on either side 0f the northbound land and facing

northbound travelers stated the following:

“THRU TRAFFIC KEEP LEFT

—

NEXT 2 MILES”.
Vance was
Vance

patrolling that section 0f the

Freeway

at the

testiﬁed that he observed that vehicles in the 80

time in question.

mph

section

were

mph plus 0r minus a few mph. Vance stated that vehicles
were generally traveling a little faster than vehicles in the right
lane. The same was true for the 65 mph section i.e., vehicles were traveling 65
mph plus 0r minus a few mph. Vance ﬁthher testiﬁed that as 0f approximately
3:00 p.m., trafﬁc ﬂow was moderate and not as congested as it would be around
5:00 pm. When commuters would be traveling home. Road conditions were also
generally traveling 80
in the left lane

dry.

At

northbound in the
vehicle,

Vance observed Defendant’s

that time,

left

lane in the 65

mph

section.

vehicle, a black

SUV,

traveling

When Defendant saw his patrol

she stiffened in her seat, applied her [brakes], and appeared very

concerned. Vance testiﬁed that such nervous reactions were pre-stop indicators 0f
criminal activity.

Vance followed

the vehicle for about 3 miles and did not

observe any swerving 0r erratic driving. Vance stated that notwithstanding her
nervousness, he did not intend t0 stop her until she slowed to 55
lane resulting in other vehicles stacking

mph

in the left

up behind Defendant based upon her

slower speed.

At
and

that point,

initiated a stop

Vance believed Defendant was impeding the ﬂow 0f trafﬁc
Vance approached the vehicle from

of Defendant’s vehicle.

began talking With Defendant and explained the reason
for the stop. Vance observed that Defendant’s hands were shaking, that she had
bloodshot eyes, and appeared anxious and nervous. Defendant also repeatedly
the passenger’s side and

asked

Why she had been
Vance learned

that

one way t0

traveling

stopped.

Defendant had rented the vehicle in California and was

Montana,

having

left

Elko,

Nevada

that

morning.

Notwithstanding Winter conditions, Defendant did not have a coat and was

wearing

sandal

type

shoes.

Based

upon

Defendant’s

reaction

and

the

circumstances of her traveling, Vance was suspicious 0f drug activity, particularly,
that

Defendant was possibly a drug courier.

At one point, as Defendant was retrieving vehicle documentation, she
opened the center console Where Vance observed an open knife and green material
which appeared to Vance t0 be marijuana fragments. Defendant acted alarmed
after opening the console and quickly shut it and then proceeded t0 100k for
documentation. Although Vance could not smell marijuana in 0r around the
vehicle, Vance also believed that Defendant could be driving impaired and under
the inﬂuence of marijuana.

Upon

receiving the license and documentation from the Defendant,

Vance

returned t0 his vehicle and contacted dispatch t0 check 0n the license and vehicle.

Vance then requested that a K-9 unit come t0 the site. Once dispatched advised
Vance that the license and vehicle were valid, Vance returned t0 Defendant’s
vehicle and gave Defendant a warning about driving too slow and impeding

Again, believing that Defendant could be under the inﬂuence, Vance

trafﬁc.

determined to conduct a ﬁeld sobriety

While Defendant performed normally

test

as to

and had Defendant

exit the vehicle.

much 0f the testing, some testing was
memory deﬁcits and eye lid

consistent With marijuana use such as short term

During the testing and investigation into impaired driving, the K—9
unit arrived and Vance observed Defendant become more nervous, alarmed, and
ﬂuttering.

Vance estimated

ﬁdgety.

that the

K-9

arrived about 24 minutes after the initial

Defendant then stated that she was going to call her “mother” and as
Defendant placed the call, Vance could hear a man’s voice 0n the other end 0f the
stop.

line.

During

this time, the

K—9

alerted

0n the vehicle Which indicated the

presence of drugs. Defendant was then arrested and a subsequent search 0f vehicle
revealed a pound of methamphetamine.

(R., pp.148-50.)

The

charged Jones

state

one count 0f trafﬁcking 400 or more grams of

With

methamphetamine, one count of misdemeanor DUI, and alleged Jones was a repeat
offender. (R., pp.50-5

1 .)

Jones ﬁled a motion t0 suppress evidence.
things, that she

“was pulled over

following the law.”

was ‘through

may

Jones alleged,

(R., pp.60-61.)

for driving in the left lane

among

even though she was properly

dint 0f the road signs near the

Broadway exit—“to

travel in the left lane as she

trafﬁc’.” (R., p.101.) Jones also argued the trafﬁc “investigation

and checking for sobriety had nothing

pp.7-97.)1

the hearing

was

generally apply t0 trafﬁc in the left lane, Ms. Jones

was immediately

abandoned and a roadside interrogation regarding questions of drugs on her person or

At

other

Per Jones, “[t]he stop never should have occurred,” because

(R., p.101.)

while Section “49-630(2)

required”—by

DUI

to

do with

driving in the

wrong

in the car

lane.” (R., p.101

0n Jones’s motion, Ofﬁcer COX was the sole Witness

.)

that testiﬁed.

(T12,

Following the hearing, Jones ﬁled a “Closing Argument in Support of Motion to

Dismiss,” again arguing that the ofﬁcer lacked reasonable suspicion that she was Violating
Section 49-630(2) by driving under the speed limit in the

left

essence, Jones argued she faced a Catch-22, because “Idaho

follow the instructions” 0f the road signs stating

148.)

As

hand

Code

§

lane.

(R., p.141-44.)

49-801 required

“THRU TRAFFIC KEEP LEFT.”

such, Jones claimed, the right-hand lane

was not

[her] t0

(R., pp.141,

“available” for her to drive

in,

and she

could not have violated Section 49-630(2):

If

LC.

[§]

49-630(2) applied to Ms. Jones as argued by the State, Ms. Jones would
result. It is undisputed that driving ten miles under the

be subj ect t0 an oppressive
speed limit

is

not against the law. Yet, Ms. Jones could not drive ten miles under

the speed limit under any scenario under the State’s theory through the stretch of
I—15 in question. If she drove in the right lane she

1

Citations t0 the transcript

volume

would be

Violating the lawfully

refer to those transcripts’ internal pagination.

In

posted signs in Violation 0f I.C.

§

49-801.

If she

drove as she did, law

enforcement could pull her over because overly aggressive drivers wanted t0 pass
her in a slower speed zone.

(R., p. 142.)

The
that

district court issued

a written decision on Jones’s motion. The court ﬁrst concluded

Ofﬁcer Cox had reasonable suspicion

TRAFFIC STAY LEFT”

to stop Jones for Violating Section 49-630(2),

signs notwithstanding:

While there were road signs directing through trafﬁc

t0 the left lane, that sign did

not expressly or implicitly authorize a vehicle to travel

speed of trafﬁc for the
49-630(2)
is

is

“THRU

left

to prevent the

lane at the time in question.

at less

than the normal

Rather, the purpose of §

hazardous condition that arises When a slower vehicle

impeding the normal trafﬁc ﬂow.

Clearly, there
left

is

some conﬂict between

the road signs directing thru trafﬁc to the

lane and the application of § 49-630(2) t0 the area in question. However, the
is not whether Defendant actually violated § 49-630(2), but

issue before the Court

Whether the ofﬁcer had a reasonable basis
49-630(2).
left lane,

As

such,

630(2)

(R., p.

1

t0 believe

The undisputed evidence reﬂects

that

driving slower than the speed limit, and

Vance had a reasonable suspicion

When he conducted

Defendant was Violating

§

Defendant was traveling in the

was impeding the ﬂow of trafﬁc.
Defendant was Violating § 49-

that

a trafﬁc stop of Defendant’s vehicle.

52.)

Turning to whether the ofﬁcer had a “basis t0 expand the purpose of the trafﬁc stop t0 an
investigation or impaired driving or drug activity,” the court concluded that he did:

Vance observed that Defendant was nervous, shaking, and had blood shot eyes.
Vance also observed indicia of Defendant being a drug courier. Particularly
compelling is Vance’s observation 0f green material in the vehicle which
appeared to Vance, based upon his training and experience, t0 be marijuana
fragments. That the material looked like marijuana

is

undisputed.

upon the information available to Vance and the totality of the
circumstances, Vance had a reasonable suspicion, based 0n articulable facts, that
apart from driving too slow Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
Therefore, based

(R., pp.153-54.)

“As such,” the court found, Ofﬁcer Cox “was justiﬁed

sobriety test and calling for a drug dog,” and the stop

p.154.)

The

district court

in conducting a

ﬁeld

was not “impermissibly prolonged.”

(R.,

concluded “that the trafﬁc stop and detention of’ Jones “was not a

Violation of her constitutional rights,” and accordingly denied her motion t0 suppress.

(R.,

p.155.)

The

parties eventually entered into a conditional plea agreement.

(R.,

pp.178-81.)

Pursuant to that agreement, Jones pleaded guilty to a lower-level methamphetamine trafﬁcking
charge and reserved the right t0 appeal from the denial 0f her motion to suppress.
186; Tr., p.1 14, L.14

The

— p.15,

district court

(R., pp.178,

L.10.)

sentenced Jones to six years imprisonment With two years ﬁxed.

p.194.) Jones timely appealed. (R., pp.198-200.)

(R.,

ISSJ
Jones states the issue 0n appeal

Did the

district court err in

as:

denying Ms. Jones’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The
Has Jones

state rephrases the issue as:

failed t0

show

the district court erred in denying her motion t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
Jones Has Failed To

A.

Show The

District

Court Erred In Denying Her Motion To Suppress

Introduction

Jones claims the

First,

district court erred in

denying her motion to suppress for two reasons.

she claims the ofﬁcer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her for Violating LC. § 49-630(2)

because, “even if [she]

was driving

was driving

in the left lane at less than the

in the only lane available for through trafﬁc,

normal speed 0f trafﬁc, she

and was thus not Violating

§ 49-

630(2).” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) This claim fails as a matter of fact, because the ofﬁcer testiﬁed

that

when he stopped

p.88, L.14

— p.89,

Jones, she had driven

L.2.) Thus,

even

on a section 0f the

if the far—right lane

signs instructing through trafﬁc to stay

left,

there

interstate

With three lanes.

was “unavailable” on account 0f the road

was a middle

lane available for trafﬁc.

ofﬁcer accordingly had reasonable suspicion that Jones violated Section 49-630(2)

impeded trafﬁc

in the left lane, as

opposed

Jones next claims that the

based 0n the

totality

to driving in the

middle

district court “clearly erred”

“had reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity to

(T12,

she

lane.

when

it

expand the trafﬁc stop

0f the circumstances.” (Appellant’s

When

The

brief, p.9.)

concluded Ofﬁcer

Cox

into a drug investigation

This argument

the ofﬁcer’s suspicion of impaired driving or drug possession—based

fails

because

on Jones’s nervous

appearance, bloodshot eyes, indicia 0f being a drug courier, and What the ofﬁcer thought were

ﬂakes 0r fragments 0f marijuana—was completely reasonable.
court erred in concluding the expansion 0f the stop

was justiﬁed.

Jones

fails t0

show

the district

Standard

B.

On

Of Review

review of a ruling 0n a motion t0 suppress, the appellate court defers t0 the

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but exercises free review of the trial court’s

determination as t0 Whether constitutional standards have been satisﬁed in light 0f the facts.
State V. Willoughbv, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State V. Fees, 140 Idaho

90 P.3d 306, 309 (2004).

81, 84,

those “[f]indings Will not be

If

ﬁndings are supported by substantial evidence in the record,

deemed

clearly erroneous.”

State V. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648,

181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State V. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481,

485

(Ct.

App. 2006)).

Ofﬁcer COX Had Reasonable Suspicion T0 Suspect Jones Was Violating Section 49630(2), Because She Was Impeding Trafﬁc In The Far Left Lane While There Was An
Available Right-Hand Lane

C.

“A

implicates the Fourth

State V.

m,

by an ofﬁcer

trafﬁc stop

Amendment’s

constitutes

a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785

(Ct.

App. 2006)

(citing

Delaware

V.

440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable
Florida V. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State V. Bishop, 146

cause t0 be reasonable.

Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory detentions, based

0n

less than

probable cause, are permissible

suspicion that a person has committed, or

m,

146 Idaho

at

81

1,

“An ofﬁcer may

203 P.3d

at

when justiﬁed by an

is

ofﬁcer’s reasonable, articulable

about t0 commit, a crime.

m,

460 U.S.at 498;

1210.

also stop a vehicle t0 investigate possible criminal behavior if there

reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle

is

is

being driven contrary t0 trafﬁc laws.” Young,

144 Idaho

at

648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing United States V. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).

“Reasonable suspicion requires

less than

probable cause but more than speculation 0r instinct on

the part of the ofﬁcer.” State V. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302,

Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion

(citation omitted).

0f the circumstances known t0 the ofﬁcer

totality

Idaho

at 811,

246 P.3d 673, 675

203 P.3d

at

at

is

(Ct.

App. 2010)

evaluated based 0n the

or before the time 0f the stop.

Mp, 146

1210; State V. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct.

App. 2003).
Section 49-630(2) provides that:

Upon

highways any vehicle proceeding at less than normal speed 0f trafﬁc at
the time and place and under the conditions then existing, shall be driven in the
all

right-hand lane available for trafﬁc, or as close as practicable t0 the right—hand

curb 0r edge of the highway, except

When overtaking and
when preparing

proceeding in the same direction 0r

passing another vehicle
for a left turn

at

an

intersection or into a private road or driveway.

LC.

§

49-630(2).

control devices:

Idaho motorists are additionally required, as a general matter, to obey trafﬁc“[t]he driver of

any vehicle

shall

obey the instructions 0f any trafﬁc-control

device placed or held in accordance With the provisions 0f this

title,

unless otherwise directed

by

a peace ofﬁcer, subject t0 the exceptions granted the driver 0f an authorized emergency vehicle

by this

title.”

LC.

§

49-8010).

In this case “[t]he undisputed evidence reﬂects that [Jones]

driving slower than the speed limit, and

was impeding

the

ﬂow

L.18 — p.22, L.24.) Thus, the court correctly concluded that
that she

was

On

was

traveling in the left lane,

of traffic.”

this created a

(R., p.152; Tr., p.21,

reasonable suspicion

Violating Section 49-630(2). (R., p.152.)

appeal Jones claims this was an error,

arguing that “Ofﬁcer

Cox

did not have

reasonable suspicion t0 believe Ms. Jones violated § 49-630(2) because, even if she was

impeding trafﬁc by driving ten miles per hour under the speed
lane available for through traﬁc.”

that “[a]t the time

left

because signs directed

she

[her],

she

was driving

“It

in the only

Jones contends

in the only lane available for

lane—insofar as “[t]he right lane was not available for through trafﬁc

all

through trafﬁc into the

left lane.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)

essentially claims, as she argued below, that the court’s interpretation

Catch-22 choice:

was driving

(Appellant’s brief, p.8 (emphasis added).)

Ofﬁcer COX observed

through trafﬁc”—the

limit,

would not make sense

for

Ms. Jones

in the right lane, while simultaneously being required

t0

by

§

0f the

be required by

§

She

statute presented a

49-6302(2) t0 drive
left lane.”

49-801(1) t0 drive in the

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

Jones’s claim

fails

signs and Section 49-801

lane

was not

it is

simply factually mistaken. Even assuming that the road

would make

the far right—hand lane “unavailable,” the far right—hand

because

Ofﬁcer Cox’s testimony made clear

the only lane available for trafﬁc.

that at the

time he initiated the stop, Jones was driving on a section 0f the interstate that had three

northbound

lanes.

Ofﬁcer COX ﬁrst observed Jones “closer

t0

Milepost 116.”

(Tr., p.22, Ls.8-9.)

described the northbound layout 0f the interstate in detail:

Q.

So at—would you agree with me
Where you start to enter city

that’s

A.

Yes.

Q.

And would you

agree with

just a quarter mile

down

me

that at approximately

that also

around Mile Marker 118, maybe

the road 0r so, that 1-15 trafﬁc travels under the

Pancheri underpass?

A.

Mile Marker 118,

limits into Idaho Falls; is that correct?

Yes.

10

He

And would you

also agree With

me

that there

is,

somewhere close

t0 that

Pancheri underpass, just t0 the north 0f it, that there’s the beginning of an

off-ramp that would go t0 Broadway in Idaho Falls?
Yes.

And

down some 0f these geographical things, would you
you g0 under—or, excuse me, that there’s an overpass
goes over Broadway shortly after that on ramp onto Broadway?
just continuing

agree with
that

me

that

Yes.

.0

And

that 1-15

if it’s

northbound trafﬁc would drive under that overpass,

correct,

going through?

Over the under—over the—

Or under the

overpass, that—the

Broadway underpass—or

overpass.

@PO?

Yeah, they drive over the Broadway

Street.

Okay. Okay. Yeah, I mixed that up. You’re correct. And then would you
agree With me that shortly after that, somewhere around—towards the end

of Mile Marker 118 and starting to approach Mile Marker 119, that there’s
on-ramp from Broadway onto I—15; is that

the end of the northbound
correct?

Yes.

.0

And

then, as

the beginning

we’re getting a

little bit

closer t0 Mile

Marker

119, there’s

ofa northbound oﬂ-ramp onto US20, correct?

Yes.

And through I-15

trafﬁc

would go under the U320 overpass,

correct?

CPO?

Correct.

And

then somewherejust a

little

bitpast Mile Marker I I9, that there ’s the

end 0fthe northbound on-rampfrom US20
P>

that

merges onto

Yes.

And is

that approximately

where you pulled Ms. Jones over?

11

[-15, correct?

A.

Yes.

(TL, p.63, L.18

— p.65, L.10 (emphasis

Based 0n
of the

this testimony,

added).)

we know

interstate that contained off-

Jones was pulled over after driving through a section

and on-ramps for the Highway 20

Ofﬁcer Cox’s

exit.

testimony later established that this very portion of the interstate had three lanes:

Q.

Now, Sergeant COX, you were asked in detail about the Broadway exit and
the Highway 20 exit is what I’ve referred t0 them as. Now, there’s an onramp from

the

Broadway

exit entering the interstate; is that correct?

Yes.

Heading north?
CPO?

Yes.

And

how many

0n the
between the Broadway on-ramp and the Highway 20 oﬂ-ramp?
point

at that

lanes 0f travel are there

interstate

Three lanes. Are you talking just northbound or north and south?

Heading

north.

CPO?

Three lanes.

Okay.

And

trafﬁc stop
interstate at

A.

was there—when you initiated
0n the defendant, was there anyone that was entering
the same time that Ms. Jones was in the left-hand lane?

speciﬁcally, as

you

recall

it,

the

No.

(TL, p.88, L.14

— p.89, L.7 (emphasis

added).) Moreover, while the district court did not

speciﬁc factual ﬁnding regarding the amount of lanes near Mile Marker 119, the

noted that Ofﬁcer

Cox was

“[t]he sole Witness” at the suppression hearing,

testimony establishes the facts of this matter.”
before she

this

was pulled

(R., p.148.)

a

district court

and concluded

“[h]is

His testimony plainly shows that

over, Jones drove over a section of 1-15 with three lanes.
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make

Thus,

it is

a fact that before Jones

middle

to drive in: the

lane.

And

was stopped she did have an
was no Catch-22

there

available right-hand lane

here, insofar as Jones could

complied both With Sections 49-630(2) and 49-801(1) by driving in the middle lane?
49-630(2) required Jones,

Who was impeding

Section 49-801(1) required Jones to

lane.

have

Section

trafﬁc in the left-hand lane, to drive in a right—hand

“KEEP LEFT”

of the trafﬁc merging on to the

highway. She could have done both by driving in the middle lane.
Thus, even assuming the right-hand lane was “unavailable” t0 Jones

was two

lanes,

When

the interstate

Ofﬁcer Cox had reasonable suspicion Jones was Violating Section 49-630(2) as

soon as 1-15 turned into three lanes going north. At that moment, because Jones was impeding
trafﬁc in the left-hand lane, despite having an available right—hand lane to drive

ample reasonable suspicion

that she violated Section 49-630(2).

As

in,

such, Jones fails to

there

was

show any

error.

D.

Ofﬁcer Cox Had Reasonable Suspicion To Investigate Jones For Possible Impaired
Driving

“An

And Drug Possession

effectuate the purpose 0f the stop.”

(Ct.

must be temporary and

investigative detention

App. 2008).

last

n0 longer than necessary

State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261,

“Because addressing the infraction

is

the purpose 0f the stop,

necessary to effectuate that purpose.” Rodriguez

longer than

is

354 (2015)

(internal quotes, brackets

and

citations omitted).

V.

United

States,

it

may

t0

1264

last

no

575 U.S. 348,

“[A]s a matter 0f course in a valid

2

The state further submits that, even had there been only two lanes, Jones could have obeyed
both statutes by not “proceeding at less than [the] normal speed of traffic.” LC. § 49-630(2).
Jones has failed to show any conﬂict in the statutes because her argument is premised on the
belief that she had
for a

some

right t0 drive in a

way that impeded

few miles does not invalidate the trafﬁc

stop.
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trafﬁc.

That she had n0 such right

trafﬁc stop, a police ofﬁcer

may

order the occupants 0f a vehicle t0 exit or to remain inside.”

1027

State V. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 105, 137 P.3d 1024,

An

investigative detention

carried out in a

manner

(Ct.

the stop

initiated,

criminality different

P.3d

at

must not only be justiﬁed

for during the course

from

that

which

initially

is

at its inception,

and duration

but must also be

t0 the circumstances

State V. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181,

in the ﬁrst place.

App. 2004). “The purpose of a stop
is

App. 2006).

that is reasonably related in scope

which justiﬁed the interference
931

(Ct.

90 P.3d 926,

not permanently ﬁxed, however, at the

of the detention there

prompted the

may

moment

evolve suspicion 0f

stop.” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 984, 88

1224.

The

district court correctly

had reasonable suspicion

concluded

that,

following the

initial

trafﬁc stop, Ofﬁcer

to investigate Jones for impaired driving and/or

Cox

drug use:

Vance observed that Defendant was nervous, shaking, and had blood shot eyes.
Vance also observed indicia of Defendant being a drug courier. Particularly
compelling is Vance’s observation of green material in the vehicle which
appeared t0 Vance, based upon his training and experience, to be marijuana
fragments. That the material looked like marijuana

is

undisputed.

upon the information available to Vance and the totality of the
circumstances, Vance had a reasonable suspicion, based 0n articulable facts, that
apart from driving too slow Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
Therefore, based

(R., pp.153-54.)

ﬁeld sobriety

test

The court concluded,

therefore, that

Ofﬁcer Cox “was justiﬁed

in conducting a

and calling for a drug dog,” and the stop was not “impermissibly prolonged.”

(R., p.154.)

Jones

fails t0

show any

error

on appeal. Instead of looking

facts before the ofﬁcer, she attempts t0 isolate

ﬁrst incorrectly argues that the facts that she

eyes

at the totality

0f the suspicious

them and contend with them piecemeal. Jones

“was nervous, and had shaking hands and bloodshot

do not suggest” she “was impaired.” (Appellant’s
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brief, p.9.)

This ignores both

human

physiology and Idaho precedent. For example, in State

V. Grigg,

149 Idaho 361, 364, 233 P.3d

1283, 1286 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court 0f Appeals held that while “bloodshot eyes alone are not

enough

crime

t0 establish reasonable suspicion that a

show impairment.

other factors they can

is

being committed,”

Li. at 364,

233 P.3d

When combined with

1286 (emphasis added).

at

Speciﬁcally, the Grigg Court pointed out that bloodshot eyes, taken together with other

suspicious facts, can supply enough reasonable suspicion “t0 investigate the crime of drug use or

possession”:

were also glassy.
were coupled
With reddening of the conjunctiva 0f his eyes and eyelid tremors. The ofﬁcer
further testiﬁed that, based 0n his training and experience, such characteristics
indicate that a person is under the inﬂuence 0f a controlled substance. Therefore,
based 0n the totality 0f the circumstances, the ofﬁcer had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that Grigg was under the inﬂuence of drugs.
In this case, not only did Grigg have bloodshot eyes, but his eyes

In addition, the ofﬁcer testiﬁed that Grigg’s glassy bloodshot eyes

Li. (footnote omitted).

“As a

result,” the

Court of Appeals concluded,

“it

was reasonable

for the

ofﬁcer t0 brieﬂy detain Grigg outside his vehicle in order t0 investigate further,” and Grigg
“failed t0

show

that the district court erred in

denying his motion to suppress.”

Here, there were far more suspicious factors present. Ofﬁcer

he suspected Jones was impaired: “because 0f
that “she

was possibly under

Ls.18-21.)

trips”

to not

explained exactly

why

bloodshot eyes” Which indicated to him

the inﬂuence of drugs, speciﬁcally indicated marijuana.” (Tr., p.29,

Ofﬁcer COX also noted

and “tend

[her] red,

Cox

Li.

that, in his

pack very much stuf

.”

experience, “drug couriers” often take “quick

(TL, p.31, Ls.18-19.)

suspicion about Jones’s nervously—delivered story—that she

was

This led t0 obvious

traveling t0 Montana, through

snow-covered Idaho, in December—yet “she hadn’t brought a coat” and was wearing “sandals or
ﬂip—ﬂops.”

(TL, p.30, Ls.1

—

p.31, L.13.)

“visibly shaking,” her “left carotid artery

Beyond

that, the

ofﬁcer could see Jones’s hands

pulsating,” and her “anxious, nervous expression”;
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nervousness that only increased
p.37, Ls.5-7; p.42, L.21

And

of course,

— p.43,
all

When

the

K-9 ofﬁcer

arrived.

(TL, p.28, Ls.23-25; p.32, Ls.5-9;

L.5.)

of these suspicious facts added to What the ofﬁcer saw in the center

console: a “ﬁve-inch blade—lock—blade knife With

suspected at that time were possibly marijuana.”

What he reasonably suspects

t0

be

illegal

some green fragment seeds

(Tr., p.28,

drugs,

it

or ﬂakes that

L.24 — p.29, L.4.) If an ofﬁcer sees

goes Without saying that this provides

reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation, if not outright probable cause for an

arrest.

And

while Jones points out that the marijuana—seeming ﬂakes turned out to not be marijuana, that
ultimately irrelevant.

like

The

district court

found

it

I

was “undisputed

[t]hat the material

marijuana,” Which justiﬁed a limited investigation to determine whether, in

fact,

it

is

looked

was. (R.,

p.154.)

Jones derides Ofﬁcer Cox’s suspicion as “based 0n nothing more than a hunch.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.10.) But this simply ignores

hunch

is

0n

a “feeling 0r guess based

all

the facts in play, and redeﬁnes the term.

intuition rather than fact.”

A

See Hunch, Oxford Living

Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/hunch (emphasis added, last Visited July

23, 2020).

relying

The ofﬁcer here was not

on the

totality

relying

on

feelings 0r

of suspicious facts outlined herein.3

that Jones either possessed illegal items or

Defendant was engaged in criminal

activity.” (R., p.154.)

A true

his

suspicions—he was

Because there was ample evidence

was driving impaired,

“Vance had a reasonable suspicion, based 0n articulable

3

guesswork for

the court correctly found that

facts, that apart

Jones

fails to

from driving too slow

show any error.

example of a “hunch” is Jones’s offhand guess that the ofﬁcer’s suspicion “might have
stemmed from Ms. Jones’s race, or her out-of—state license plates” a baseless allegation that
Jones does not even attempt t0 support with some citation to the record, or any other evidence.

(E Appellant’s brief,

p. 10.)
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CONCLUSION
The
motion

state respectfully requests this

t0 suppress,

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

order denying her

and afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

DATED this 23rd day 0f July, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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